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Abstract
Many disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives, including land use planning, tend to ignore existing long-term inequalities
in urban space. Furthermore, scholars working on urban disaster governance do not adequately consider how day-to-day
DRR governing practices can (re)produce these. Hence, following a recent interest in the political dimensions of disaster
governance, this article explores under what conditions the implementation of DRR land uses (re)produce spatial injustice
on the ground. We develop a theoretical framework combining politics, disaster risk, and space, and apply it to a case
study in Santiago, Chile. There, after a landslide disaster in the city’s foothills in 1993, a multi-level planning arrangement
implemented a buffer zone along the bank of a ravine to protect this area from future disasters. This buffer zone, however,
transformed a long-term established neighbourhood, splitting it into a formal and an informal area remaining to this day.
Using qualitative data and spatial analysis, we describe the emergence, practices, and effects of this land use. While this
spatial intervention has proactively protected the area, it has produced further urban exclusion and spatial deterioration,
and reproduced disaster risks for the informal households within the buffer zone.We explain this as resulting from a gover-
nance arrangement that emerged from a depoliticised environment, enforcing rules unevenly, and lacking capacities and
unclear responsibilities, all of which could render DRR initiatives to be both spatially unjust and ineffective. We conclude
that sustainable and inclusive cities require paying more attention to the implementation practices of DRR initiatives and
their relation to long-term inequities.
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1. Introduction
Cities are important sites for realising climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR). This re-
quires urban governance to move away from state-
centric, top-down approaches towards more horizon-
tal and coordinated work with communities and rele-
vant actors. Research on factors contributing to ‘good
governance’ of disaster risk highlights the need for
cities to reduce vulnerability and hazard exposure while
enhancing democratic and effective protection (e.g.,
Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Gall, Cutter, & Nguyen, 2014;
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2020).
However, while urban disaster governance can pro-
mote sustainable and resilient development, achieving
such goals in practice is complex. Normative and tech-
nocratic approaches do not adequately address the
political dimensions of city governance (Swyngedouw,
2005; Tierney, 2012). Academic research increasingly
focuses on decentralisation and scale (Marks & Lebel,
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2016; Rumbach, 2016), accountability (Raju & da Costa,
2018), informality (Parthasarathy, 2015), community par-
ticipation (Pelling, 2011), networks and co-governance
(Srikandini, van Voorst, & Hilhorst, 2018), urbanisa-
tion trends (Miller & Douglass, 2016), and vulnerability
(Sandoval & Voss, 2016). These works emphasize how
institutions, socio-political relations, and discourses are
coordinated and mediated in city contexts (Marks, 2015;
Wamsler, 2006).
We aim to contribute to this literature on the poli-
tics of disaster governance by analysing the practices in-
volved in land use planning as a particular instrument for
reducing risks in cities. Land use management has been
regarded as amore effective systemic and integratedway
of dealing with hazards, in comparison to using singular
instruments such as warning systems, relief and insur-
ance, or structural measures (Burby, 1998). The basic no-
tion in this context is that, “rather than trying to keep the
flood out of people’s way, government [should work] to
keep people out of the flood’s way by discouraging de-
velopment of hazardous areas” (Burby, 1998, p. 9). Land
use planning for DRR includes zoning regulations, build-
ing codes, flood-proof requirements, the acquisition and
transformation of land, and/or information regarding de-
sign techniques (Burby, Deyle, Godschalk, & Olshansky,
2000; Godschalk, 2003). It holds a crucial opportunity
for managing risks in cities and, being embedded in
the wider functioning of the urban system, involves a
number of governance innovations (Asian Development
Bank, 2016).
However, all such interventions will have winners
and losers: “Land use planning, while superficially a
technical act, is more often a reflection (not to say
tool of) the dominant interests in a city and their vi-
sion for its future” (Pelling, 2011, p. 384). Evidence
shows that many well-meaning land use planning ap-
proaches produce unintended, ambivalent, and unjust
results in space (Sandoval, Gonzalez-Muzzio, & Albornoz,
2017). Land use planning can negatively affect already
disadvantaged groups and “protect economically valu-
able areas over low-incomeorminority neighbourhoods”
(Anguelovski et al., 2016, p. 334); adopting a coastal
buffer zone produced socio-economic disparities, liveli-
hoods lost, and ecosystem damages in post-disaster
Sri Lanka (Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006); the selec-
tive application of high-risk zones in Manilla in the name
of resilience has led to evictions (Alvarez & Cardenas,
2019). Disaster governance can exacerbate vulnerabil-
ity by (re)creating some ‘unsafe conditions’ (Sandoval &
Voss, 2016). Although the literature asserts that DRR—
like all policy interventions—is a political process, there
is still a need to expand this knowledge in terms of
how DRR governance evolves over time and how and
when policy implementation produces certain effects on
the ground. Clearly, post-disaster politics is very complex
(Ingram et al., 2006; Pelling & Dill, 2010). Hence, this ar-
ticle asks: Under what conditions does the implemen-
tation of land use planning for DRR produce and/or re-
produce spatial injustice on the ground? We answer this
question using an urban disaster governance framework
and apply it to a case study in Chile where, following a
landslide disaster in 1993 in the foothills of Santiago, the
authorities developed a disaster risk management plan
including a buffer zone in order to reduce the risks of fu-
ture landslides.
This article first presents a conceptual discussion of
urban disaster governance, then the research design,
followed by our findings, and a discussion and conclu-
sion section.
2. The Politics of Urban Disaster Governance:
A Conceptual Framework
Our framework combines the politics of governancewith
critical understandings of disaster risks and urban space,
and aims to develop a situated analysis of urban disas-
ter governance. The politics of governance refers to how
different actors network, participate, and collaborate to
solve their own problems (Bevir, 2013; Gupta, Verrest,
& Jaffe, 2015; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sorensen, 2012).
While a normative understanding of governance focuses
on what constitutes ‘good governance’ and calls for legit-
imacy, accountability, equity, efficiency, and other such
principles, this is critiqued for being implemented tech-
nocratically, obscuring political dimensions, and priori-
tizing efficiency over equity. As such, it may actually un-
dermine democratic principles (Swyngedouw, 2005) and
oversimplify complex social processes, resulting in “poli-
cies [that] often do not fully achieve the envisaged ob-
jectives and regularly have unintended consequences”
(Di Baldassarre, Kemerink, Kooy, & Brandimarte, 2014,
p. 136). On the contrary, an analytical perspective on
governance considers it as inherently political, encom-
passing differences, contestations, and power-laden de-
cisions (Castán Broto, 2017; Gupta et al., 2015). For ur-
ban disasters, these include contesting visions of govern-
ing cities and their consequences for producing vulner-
ability and hazard exposure, as well as how power influ-
ences actor relations and shapes institutions, particularly
in a context of decentralising fiscal and political compe-
tencies. For example, an ‘incomplete decentralisation’ in
Thailand led to a transfer of mandates without accompa-
nying resources to lower governmentswhich unevenly in-
creased flood risks (Marks& Lebel, 2016). Hence, there is
a need to unpack the inherent power relations between
actors in existing horizontal and vertical arrangements.
We focus here on everyday practices of governance
as a fruitful way for understanding the politics of policy
design and implementation (Cornea, Véron, & Zimmer,
2017). Such governance processes involve continuing
negotiation and adaptation of norms and plans, and
in these negotiations, issues may be technocratised by
those with power (Ferguson, 1994). The “bias in dis-
aster governance research” also privileges a focus on
state-based processes over bottom-up and informal en-
gagements (Huang, 2018, p. 384). Therefore, focusing
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on everyday practices helps to understand the informal
and open-ended nature of certain formal structures in
space (Koster & Nuijten, 2016; McFarlane, 2012; Roy,
2005; Yiftachel, 2009), such as disaster risks and informal-
ity (Parthasarathy, 2015) or coastal resilience planning
(Weinstein, Rumbach, & Sinha, 2019), and exposes the
unintended effects arising from (de)politicised settings
(Marks, 2015). However, it should clearly not lead to an
abdication of state responsibility.
We link urban politics, disaster risks, and injustice.
Urban problems (e.g., inequalities, exclusions) do not
just reflect governance failures, but arise from how
governance systems work as results of socio-spatial
processes of stratification that represent particular
(in)justices (Harvey, 1973; Soja, 2010). Such problems are
exacerbated during disasters, understood not as natural
but deeply social and contentious phenomena that can
increase marginalisation (Susman, O’Keefe, & Wisner,
1983) and vulnerability (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis,
2004), calling for a focus on root causes (Oliver-Smith,
Alcántara-Ayala, Burton, & Lavell, 2017) and disaster
justice (Douglass & Miller, 2018; Huang, 2018; Nygren,
2018). We argue that analysing spatial (in)justices is not
only about describing the end state of social groups in
space, but also about the relational and multilevel struc-
tural processes that put some people in marginal posi-
tions (Wacquant, 2015). Hence, we focus on “how, and
where, power is being exercised, to whose benefit, and
how it leads to urban development where risk is un-
equally distributed” (Rumbach, 2017, p. 784). Locating
spatial injustices thus entails expanding on the distri-
butional, procedural, and recognitional dimensions of
justice as exerted and produced by situated practices
of governance.
We integrate the above in a conceptual framework
presented in Figure 1, which visualises the need to me-
diate land use planning and its multi-level implemen-
tation arrangements through what we call their every-
day governing practices. By addressing the interaction
of these practices with grounded actors, that is, how
planning interfaces with communities on the ground, we
can further understand the ambivalent consequences
of positive DRR outcomes along with the socio-spatial
(in)justices that emerge. Ultimately, this can help to ad-
dress the process of implementation and outcomes of
land use planning that make DRR not only ineffective but
also unjust.
3. Research Design
We combined qualitative and spatial methods for un-
derstanding the implementation of a land use plan
in Chile. We conducted six months of fieldwork fo-
cused on an area of the foothills of Santiago (see
Figure 2), characterised by steep slopes and hazardous
hydro-geological formations (Muñoz, 1990; Sepúlveda,
Rebolledo, & Vargas, 2006). We gained access through
a long-term resident of the foothills and later followed a
snow-balling process for identifying and contacting key
informants. We conducted 48 in-depth anonymised in-
terviews that included: members of the local commu-
nities and residents with experience in planning initia-
tives; municipal representatives working on urban and
emergency planning; politicians and representatives of
national institutions; and experts in Chilean urban plan-
ning. We also conducted participant observation in com-
munity meetings related to risk awareness and emer-
gency planning. We analysed relevant policy documents,
historical archives, technical and scientific studies, re-
ports of past disasters, and the planning instruments de-
signed and implemented in the aftermath of a landslide
disaster. During our fieldwork and document analysis we
identified the scale and interrelation of actors to con-
sider both vertical and horizontal arrangements in place.
As we show below, our case represents a local-level phe-
nomenon embedded in hierarchical and top-down ar-
rangements that are critically affecting land use policy
implementation and its outcomes. Finally, we used offi-
cial spatial data (Infraestructura de Datos Geoespaciales
Chile, n.d.) to map some particularities of the land use.
On May 3rd, 1993, heavy rainfall and high tem-
peratures produced a debris flow or ‘alluvium’ in the
Macul Ravine (Naranjo & Varela, 1996; Oficina Nacional
de Emergencias, 1995). The ensuing floods impacted
28 thousand families in east Santiago, damaged 5,610
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Figure 1. Framework for urban disaster governance. Source: Authors.
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Figure 2. Research area in south-east Santiago, Chile. Source: Authors based on Infraestructura de Datos Geoespaciales
Chile (n.d.).
Emergencias, 1995). The most affected households be-
longed to La Florida, a comuna (Chile’s lowest tier ter-
ritorial division) in south-east Santiago. 23 people died,
8 disappeared, 85 suffered severe injuries, and 3,800
people lost their home. The relief and recovery entailed
victim relocation to an emergency camp for almost two
years, and subsequently to a newly constructed public
housing project called Santa Teresa located near their
original dwelling, but in an area protected from the
overflows of the Macul Ravine (Secretaría Regional de
Vivienda y Urbanismo [SEREMI]–Ministerio de Vivienda
y Urbanismo [MINVU], 2013).
For our fieldwork, we focused on the pobla-
ciones (neighbourhoods) of La Higuera and Ampliación
La Higuera near the bank of the Macul Ravine, in
La Florida. These poblaciones developed through ru-
ral migration during the 1960s and 1970s, accessing
urban space either through land occupations or via
state housing policies (Astaburuaga, 1987; Muñoz, 1990;
SEREMI–MINVU, 2013). We also focused on other sites
throughout the foothills, where most of the original
residents currently live: the Santa Teresa, El Esfuerzo,
and Las Perdices neighbourhoods, and visited com-
munity centres and the seven mitigation ponds con-
structed for reducing risks in this area (Ministerio de
Obras Públicas, 2006). We contextualised this field re-
search in relation to Chile’s institutional development.
The country’s response to disasters, despite their fre-
quency and magnitude, has been a reactive one (Camus,
Arenas, & Lagos, 2016; Sandoval & Voss, 2016). This in-
cludes the processes of post-disaster recovery as well
as more long-term risk management principles, which
have tended to be improvised and less planned. In rela-
tion to the institutional background of urban planning
in Santiago, this emerges from different levels of gov-
ernment. While national laws provide the general in-
stitutional framework, regional and local instruments
provide the details of land use planning. The latter in-
clude the Metropolitan Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador
Metropolitano de Santiago [PRMS]), which aims at de-
veloping space in the whole region, comprising 52 comu-
nas (MINVU, 1994). The PRMS defines land uses for the
metropolitan area, including areas excluded from de-
velopment due to natural hazards. On the local level,
each comuna should have a Master Regulatory Plan
(Plan Regulador Comunal [PRC]), which details land uses
within their urban limit. Chile’s historical decentralisa-
tion process contributes to such urban planning arrange-
ments, which are characterised by strong centralisation,
metropolitan fragmentation, and weak capacities in the
lower tiers (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano,
2017; Garreton, 2017), characteristics that also affect
negatively disaster governance (Sandoval & Voss, 2018).
4. Results
4.1. The Emergence of a Post-Disaster Multi-Level
Arrangement
Following the impacts of the 1993 disaster, the Interior
Ministry issued Decree 765 declaring a “Zone affected
by the catastrophe” (Ministerio del Interior, 1993). This
supported relief and recovery for the victims settled
inside it, enabling them to access housing subsidies
and relocation procedures to the Santa Teresa village.
In 1994, after decades of ignoring Santiago’s natural sys-
tem (Larrain, 1992), a new Metropolitan Plan was ap-
proved (MINVU, 1994). This plan included a number
of risk zoning regulations that had to be implemented
with its formalisation. Among other norms, the PRMS de-
fined areas adjacent to ravines as “Ravine parks” (PRMS
Art. 5.2.3.3; MINVU, 1994), where only recreational and
other non-permanent activities are allowed; it identified
areas susceptible to flood from ravines, where devel-
opment is restricted or human settlements prohibited
(PRMS Art. 8.2.1.1; MINVU, 1994); and introduced sim-
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ilar restrictions in relation to geophysical risks, particu-
larly from landslide hazards (PRMS Art. 8.2.1.4; MINVU,
1994). Given the lack of PRC in the foothills of La Florida,
the PRMS mandated that these norms were applied to
this new urban space without discussion in the after-
math of the 1993 disaster, first on a temporary basis and
then formalised in 2001 with a new PRC. This hierarchi-
cal and top-down application of land use norms created a
300,000 squaremetres zone alongside theMacul Ravine,
with a minimum of 100 metres width on each side in
which urban development is prohibited or restricted.
Figure 3 shows the restriction zones adopted in the
research area associated with the aforementioned re-
strictions: ravine parks (AV3); flood risks (R-1); and land-
slide hazards (R-4). The map shows that La Higuera and
Ampliación La Higuera are visible as part of the buffer
zone. The changed land use transformed these areas
by dividing each into a formal section (where uses in-
clude residential, commercial, and socio-cultural activi-
ties) and an informal sectionwith restricted land use pos-
sibilities. Figure 3 also shows that the buffer zone ignores
block divisions and streets, running through many resi-
dential plots. The exclusion zone affects those residents
whose homes fall now in the restricted zones: about
694 people in 99 households. Here we also find two in-
formal campamentos (a type of informal settlement in
Chile), the Santa Luisa and Quebrada de Macul, inhab-
ited by 61 families.
The PRMS has triggered multiple transformations in
the foothills, for example expanding Santiago’s eastern
limit, increasing the urban density of the foothills of The
Andes and generating conflicts and environmental mobil-
isations (Biskupovic, 2015). Regarding the exclusion zone,
this area corresponds in part with the zone of the afore-
mentioned Decree 765, thus, where the bulk of the dis-
aster victims were located. However, the rapid and ver-
tical imposition of this arrangement and the buffer zone
through a number of governance features practices has
impacted the lives of the local people for more than two
decades, as detailed in the next subsections.
4.2. Practices of Implementation: Participation,
Enforcement, and Management
To assess the implementation of this post-disaster land
use, we focus on three key governance practices explain-
ing the current state of the buffer zone: voluntary relo-
cation; arbitrary enforcement; and the management of
acquired land.
After the 1993 disaster, the housing authorities un-
der the MINVU played an important role, particularly
the Service for Housing and Planning (SERVIU), which
Figure 3.Map showing the risk-related norms in the PRC and the urbanised buffer zone. Source: Authors.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 244–255 248
implements MINVU’s plans and policies. SERVIU man-
aged the emergency camp after the disaster and devel-
oped the Santa Teresa población for housing disaster
victims permanently (Oficina Nacional de Emergencias,
1995; SEREMI–MINVU, 2013). Most people residing in
the camp were offered and accepted relocation to
Santa Teresa. However, some residents from Ampliación
La Higuera and La Higuera returned to their homes
after the disaster, as their homes had not been de-
stroyed. Inhabiting a risky area according to Decree 765,
interviews reveal that SERVIU developed a “semi-
voluntary process of negotiation” to relocate them in the
new población. Government officials would approach
property-owners and offer an exchange between their
home and one in Santa Teresa (depending on the value
of their home this would be an apartment in a three-
storey housing project or a house unit). Many residents
accepted this and exchanged property rights. But de-
spite pressure during this negotiation process, some fam-
ilies continued to live in the exclusion zone. The semi-
voluntariness of the process was thought to push local
residents to exchange their properties or lose everything,
but as the housing units of many were still standing, they
risked remaining there for different reasons. As one inter-
viewee explains: “If I exchange my house and plot from
one in Santa Teresa, I leave here all of my memories
and experiences….They do not go with me. Everything
is here, my people, my neighbours….” For other intervie-
wees, their original living conditions were better than in
Santa Teresa, which they saw as a housing project with
lower urban standards. Hence, the semi-voluntary pro-
cess failed to relocate all the people from the buffer zone
because of their long-standing attachment and socio-
economic conditions.
A second governance feature refers to the process
of defining the buffer zone. To the north of the Macul
Ravine bank, the exclusion zone had several demarca-
tions of different sizes between 1994 and 2001. One en-
compassed the complete neighbourhoods of Ampliación
La Higuera and La Higuera (i.e., Decree 765). Another re-
spected the design of streets and plots but was never for-
malised. The chosen demarcation (Figure 3) measures a
minimum of 100 metres from the ravine bank and cuts
across several plots. In the South, the line was drawn
along the Northern border of Santa Teresa and the ex-
clusion zone was transformed into a public park in 2003.
To the east, the line is drawn along the border of the
community of El Esfuerzo, which thus remains formal.
Nonetheless, between 1994 and 2001, the PRMS applied
lines that rendered El Esfuerzo within the exclusion zone.
Then, continuous negotiation with state actors and es-
pecially connections with a politician with roots in the
area resulted in a re-drawing of the line. This informal
network is not part of the local or regional levels of gov-
ernment, but resulted directly from access to MINVU at
the national scale through this political figure. Local rep-
resentatives discussed this with housing and planning
authorities, who redrew the line in the southern part,
despite its hazard exposure. As this politician remem-
bers, “this was done explicitly so that people do not
lose their households, [but] they live in an area of high
risks…and they know it.” This case shows the selective
and political enforcement of the norms related to the ex-
clusion zone.
Finally, we discuss land management practices.
During the process of relocation, SERVIU was supposed
to buy the housing plots inside the buffer zone and trans-
form them according to PRMS restrictions, that is, into
recreational spaces. However, while authorities knew
that all properties within the exclusion zone should have
been acquired and managed, the actual process proved
to be difficult in practice. For decades, Chilean State
housing structures have been focused on providing an
important number of housing units through a targeted
and subsidiarymodel (Cociña, 2018), which has impeded
the development of regulatory responsibilities. Thus, the
participation of the public sector in land buyouts is in-
effective given its institutional capacities and scant re-
sources. As a politician explained: “We tried to trans-
form this [space] into a civic neighbourhood, with a
church, a community centre, but the management ca-
pacity from the Housing Ministry impeded this kind of
project….This would have been the only way to avoid the
future squats.” As a result of state bureaucracy, a signif-
icant area of the buffer zone filled with empty houses
and plots became an unmanaged informal space with ir-
regular occupations, entailing some effects that we un-
pack now.
4.3. The Just and Unjust Effects of the Land Use
The land use plan has produced some positive outcomes.
It organises spatial development while protecting thou-
sands of people living in formally defined ‘safe’ areas
from natural hazards. This is recognised by the victims of
the 1993 disaster settled in Santa Teresa. However, they
still suffer from a post-disaster recovery process linked to
neoliberal housing policies, which resulted in relocation
to segregated, densely populated areas that lack basic ur-
ban services (Rodríguez & Sugranyes, 2004), features ac-
knowledged throughout the foothills. The Santa Teresa is
an example of what has been described as the ‘dark side’
of Chile’s neoliberal housing policies: Whereas the aggre-
gated housing deficit has diminished with these policies,
they have done so by increasing socio-spatial segrega-
tion and generating highly insecure, violent, and dete-
riorated spaces for lower income groups (Ducci, 1997).
Alongwith this trend experiencedby the relocated debris
flow victims, the multi-level arrangement and the buffer
zone generated have (re)produced spatial injustices for
the communities settled there. Based on the issues iden-
tified by residents of the buffer zone, we have focused on
those that are further marginalising them as a commu-
nity and affecting their local resilience. We categorised
these and expand on three issues: urban exclusion; spa-
tial deterioration; and disaster risks reproduction.
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4.3.1. Urban Exclusion
With relocation, abandoned houses and plots unman-
aged by SERVIUwere sometimes squatted by the original
ownerswho, after receiving a unit in Santa Teresa, rented
that unit out, or by people from the exclusion zone it-
self as a means to enlarge their plot, locally referred
to as micro-squatting. Although these squatters are of-
ficially subject to eviction, such practices also address
over-crowding problems. Many squatters are from the
neighbourhood itself or come from nearby areas, arriv-
ing from other informal spaces around the foothills aim-
ing for more permanent dwelling. Therefore, this space
has produced an irregular rental housing market for
vulnerable groups seeking households, such as interna-
tional migrants (especially Peruvians). The 2017 Census
shows that while immigrants represent 6% of the people
living formally in La Higuera, they are 12% of the inhabi-
tants of the exclusion zone. Also, they tend to be younger
than in their formal counterpart, being particularly eco-
nomically active groups. Although not necessarily ille-
gal, international immigrants are generally more likely
to suffer from structural problems related to housing
(Fundación Vivienda, 2018). These rental spaces are pre-
carious, with poor quality housing (e.g.,mediaguas), ille-
gal connections towater and electricity services, and lack
of tenure security. Such irregular spatial practices are log-
ical in Santiago given its structural lack of access to de-
cent and affordable housing, especially when public poli-
cies are associated with segregation, overcrowding, and
low quality for low income groups (Fundación Vivienda,
2018; Rodríguez & Sugranyes, 2004). The buffer zone
provides respite from over-crowding but reproduces ex-
clusionary development processes that arises from in-
adequate state policies and the decisions of vulnerable
groups given their limited choices.
4.3.2. Spatial Deterioration
The buffer zone is spatially deteriorating in public places,
particularly along the bank of the Macul Ravine. Unlike
the southern part where a green public park was built
with regional-level funding, the northern exclusion zone
is deserted and undeveloped, and used for crime, drug-
dealing, and drug-use, increasing local insecurities (see
Figure 4a and 4b). While owned by the municipality, it re-
portedly lacks funds for managing and transforming this
public area. But there is also uneven funding for services
such as streets or sidewalk pavements (see Figure 4c and
4d), or for addressing the current termite infestation, as
residents of the exclusion zone cannot apply for public
subsidies. Thus, households also experience spatial dete-
rioration as residents are unwilling to invest in their prop-
erties given their irregular status, as a potential sale value
would be only the fiscal value, roughly 59% of themarket
price (Ruiz-Tagle, Labbé, Rocco, Schuster,&Muñoz, 2018).
As a resident explains: “We are frozen, we cannot apply
to these public funds for improving our houses…[and]
the termites are the cancer of wood.” A 75-year-old resi-
dent says she cannot access credit and that her “beautiful
house is falling little by little.” As a result, properties in-
side the exclusion zone have devaluated, making owners
poorer, despite long-term ownership.
4.3.3. Disaster Risk Reproduction
Many informants and official documents argue that con-
structing sevenmitigation ponds, roughly two kilometres
upstream from the buffer zone, has reduced the likely im-
pact of an event similar to the 1993 disaster (Sepúlveda
et al., 2006; SEREMI–MINVU & INDUAMERICANA, 2014).
These ponds need maintenance and systematic clean-
ing. However, a persistent ambivalence towards manag-
ing risks persists in the area in relation to the Macul
Ravine and other ignored ravines (Ferrando, Sarricolea,
& Pliscoff, 2014; Fuentealba & Verrest, 2020; Garrido &
Sepúlveda, 2012; SEREMI–MINVU & INDUAMERICANA,
2014). Such risks are borne by the informal community in
the buffer zone. Living in an informal settlement means
not only that theymight face greater uncertainties in the
event of another disaster, but also that they inhabit a
space that all acknowledge as hazardous. As a resident
describes: “What happens tomorrow…if there is a new
alluvium? Those people will not have any housing solu-
tion because they were settled in a prohibited place.”
Another resident points out that their choice to live here
limits their ability to demand permanent risk reduction.
‘Voluntarily’ living in the exclusion zone has in practice
made this community invisible to disaster planning ini-
tiatives, reproducing their disaster vulnerability.
After an alluvium in March 2015 in northern Chile,
an opportunity for addressing problems in the exclusion
zone emerged. Then, some discussions took place at
the national level (e.g., Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional
de Chile, 2015) and relevant public organizations and
the community met in the foothills to discuss, inter alia,
three relevant topics for the buffer zone. First, the need
to address irregular occupation of SERVIU owned plots,
which led SERVIU to update the registry of these, includ-
ing those belonging to private owners (n = 98), those
it had acquired (n = 93), and those it needed to ac-
quire (n = 41). Second, while some efforts at improving
disaster response in the buffer zone were made, these
were limited to emergency preparedness and evacua-
tion routes. Regardless, informants state that bureau-
cratic obstacles impeded the realisation of massive evac-
uation try-outs. Finally, following a participatory process
in 2017, it was decided that the abandoned public space
north of the ravine should be transformed into a new
green public park, with a design to be developed in 2020.
However, even though the residents of the exclusion
zone gained some visibility, there has not been any sub-
stantive change in their situation. From their perspective,
the land use initiative has condemned them to live in un-
certainty regarding both spatial injustices and possible
climate disasters.
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Figure 4. Deteriorating spaces in the buffer zone. Source: Authors’ archive fromMay 2018 (Figures 4a and 4b) and Google
Street View from August 2015 (Figures 4c and 4d).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our article expanded the knowledge on urban disaster
governance by addressing the relationship between DRR,
urban politics, and spatial (in)justices. By grounding gov-
ernance in situated practices, we showed that despite
well-intentioned initiatives defining risk areas being im-
plemented, they reproduce and even create new injus-
tices. While a land use plan can protect a population
by defining a buffer zone that restricts development, it
can adversely include those who relocate to worse hous-
ing situations or stay informally within the buffer zone.
The planning process of excluding land from urban de-
velopment also furthered socio-spatial exclusion of local
communities. Addressing the challenges of the poor and
marginalised needs resources and political will. But in
particular, three governance conditions need to be con-
sidered in DRR and urban planning.
First, as post-disaster settings are highly contentious
moments, decisions taken rapidly will affect concerned
people in the short and long-term. However, in such
rapid decision-making, there is little space for address-
ing contestations, creating depoliticised environments
where no discussions of the root causes of risks are ad-
dressed. The Santiago case shows how affected groups
see their participation in risk management processes re-
duced (as in the Santa Teresa housing recovery) or ex-
cluded (as in structural disaster responses like the mit-
igation ponds or the exclusion zone). Not only are lo-
cal knowledge, choices, and experiences excluded in
some risk management processes, but interventions
themselves may produce adverse and detrimental con-
sequences such as within the informalised commu-
nity. Hence, the depoliticization of post-disaster set-
tings means a lack of power and participation of local
communities, which implies that planning interventions
should consider their long-term consequences and ad-
dress structural causes of uneven disaster risks.
Second, inconsistent enforcement of interventions
may produce unjust situations. The voluntariness of re-
location during the exclusion zone’s definition and the
lack of enforcement of the ban on building in the exclu-
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sion zone has led to households in risky areas experienc-
ing economic hardship. Although the El Esfuerzo commu-
nity managed to move the border of the exclusion zone
and thus lives formally, it is at risk from future floods
and landslides. From a DRR perspective, this shows how
grounded risk management can be both spatially un-
just and ineffective, even rendering useless the dichoto-
mous definition of formal and informal. This mirrors
Yiftachel’s (2009) grey spaces in that defining certain cat-
egories becomes blurry, particularly by naming spaces
as formal/secure and informal/at risk. It also raises ques-
tions about whether governance interventions should
aim at making spatial areas less vulnerable or people
less vulnerable, and how to address the dilemma where
people either comply to voluntary relocations or through
their own choices face further marginalisation.
Finally, governance actors have uneven capacities.
We described how transferring norms and regulations
from one level of government to another does not con-
sider problems associated withmanaging urban space at
the local level. This is consistent with previous evidence
of disaster governance in Chile in relation to hierarchical
and top-down inter-relations between scales of govern-
ment, as Sandoval and Voss (2018) argue in a recent post-
disaster context. In that sense, our analysis adds an addi-
tional dimension by describing how governance arrange-
ments extend over time,maintaining some unjust effects
on the ground. This includes the bureaucratic complex-
ity and resource shortage in managing empty houses
and plots and developing abandoned spaces. Hence, the
buffer zone problems reflect low capacity and resources
at local level and the political lack of will at higher lev-
els to reduce the vulnerability of people by using an ap-
peasement strategy of pacification. For sustainable, in-
clusive, and resilient cities, the focus must be on the
daily practices and challenges of disaster governance and
on empowering governance actors at the lowest level to
structurally address the long-term challenges for better
risk reduction and spatial justice.
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